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Firms producing differentiated products have high margins and
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and therefore higher average markups. The model predicts endogenous
systematic and idiosyncratic riskiness as well as endogenous intensity
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1 Introduction
Firms often strive to differentiate their products from those of their competi-
tors. Whether it be automobiles, smart-phones, clothing or even vegetables,
firms often make an effort to get customers to know their products and how
they are different from the rest. Both product development and marketing
are areas of a firm’s managerial activity that can be thought in part as being
about product differentiation. Firms choose how much time and effort to
spend in these activities. The resulting differentiation of a firm’s products
has implications for its total earnings, its profit margins and also for the
sensitivity of the firm to shocks of different kinds. Since product differentia-
tion potentially affects the firm’s value, its systematic riskiness and therefore
its expected returns it is logical to investigate product differentiation from
an asset pricing perspective. How does differentiation affect stock returns?
How do different systematic risk scenarios affect firm’s differentiation de-
cisions? How do investment, output, price-cost markups and profitability
respond to changes in systematic risk or in the price of this risk?
Also, there’s an important empirical controversy that demands more
investigation. Hou and Robinson (2006), using Compustat data, find that
more firms in more concentrated industries pay lower returns while instead
Eli, Klasa, Yeung (2009), adding US Census data find that, for the case
of manufacturing, firms in less concentrated industries do not pay higher
returns. The results in Hou and Robinson (2006) are more consistent with
the standard intuition for the relationship between competition and returns,
the latter paper uses a data set that is more likely to capture the true
competitiveness of individual industries and yet finds the opposite result.
This empirical controversy can also be studied from the point of view of
product differentiation.
We develop a model of product differentiation that lets me provide an-
swers to some of these questions as well as bring more clarity to the con-
troversy described above. In our model the firm chooses how many new
product developments to engage in. After developing the products the firm
can observe the characteristics of the market for these products in terms of
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the market size and in terms of how ’different’ the product is from that of
the competition. It then chooses how much output to produce for the mar-
kets of each of the products it developed. While it is costly to develop more
products, each new product development gives the firm an opportunity to
find a really good market. Products that are more differentiated are good
for the firm because they let it get high profit margins and therefore less
risk. We analyze this problem by contrasting the optimal behavior of the
firm given different levels of (or prices for) systemic risk.
The model predicts that firms produce relatively more of the more dif-
ferentiated products when there is more systematic risk. We call this an
increase in the skewness of the product mix. The intuition is that the
profit stream from more differentiated products is less sensitive to system-
atic shocks and therefore when systematic risk increases the firm values the
output from those products more and therefore produces relatively more
for these markets. From a time series perspective, this is consistent with
the large literature in macroeconomics that finds that markups are counter-
cyclical under the assumption in a large part of the asset pricing literature
that the price of risk is higher in recessions. Intuitively, more product dif-
ferentiation is equivalent in the model to higher price-cost markups and so
if the firm faces more risk it focuses more on more differentiated products.
If a higher fraction of output is produced for highly differentiated products
then the average markup will increase.
The model also predicts an effect of changes in systematic risk on the
firm’s product development decisions. The firm devotes more resources, rel-
ative to total production, to the development of new products if systematic
risk is high than if it is low. This follows from the skewness prediction above.
Skewness implies that the firm’s value is more dependent on the single ’best’
new product that it develops. This implies in turn that it devotes relatively
more resources to finding this best product. We do not interpret this as
an increase in innovation but instead as a search for market niches that are
protected from competition.
In a general sense, the model allows the firm to explicitly devote resources
to reducing its own riskiness in response to the environment’s riskiness. This
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intuition can potentially rationalize some of the existing evidence for the
relationship between excess returns and product market competition. In
our model firms compete more in industries (or periods of time) that are
intrinsically less risky and compete less in industries (or periods of time)
that are intrinsically more risky. In other words, firm decisions undo part
of the differences in the environments that they face. This provides a new
perspective on the relationship between returns and competition. Firms
in high systemic risk industries will compete less, but will still be riskier,
than firms in low systemic risk industries which compete more intensely.
This reasoning can potentially explains why it is hard to find an empirical
relationship between concentration and returns as Eli, Klasa and Yeung
(2009) have shown.
Although a large body of empirical and theoretical literature studies
cross sectional asset returns, relatively few papers look at product market
competition and its implications for asset returns. Novy-Marx (2009) de-
scribes a model where industry competition is Cournot-type and based on
different marginal costs. Firms, each one with a different productivity com-
pete with other firms in their industry. This feature lets that model rational-
ize the finding that the main source of the value premium is within-industry
value premium. Similarly, Aguerrevere (2009) finds a cyclical concentration
premium in a model with Cournot-type competition based on differences in
investment and capital utilization. In another related paper Bena and Gar-
lappi (2011) model an innovation race where innovations create negative
externalities on the rest of the firms. In their model returns decline when
the firm invests and increase when other firms invest. In contrast to these
works, in our model firms will be choosing how much to compete. They
decide how much to concentrate on producing products that are highly dif-
ferentiated and also they decide how much to spend on looking for highly
differentiated products.
Also, there is a wealth of models built to describe the relationship be-
tween firms’ actions or firms’ characteristics and their stock returns which
focus on the firms’ investment behavior, given a set of shocks and frictions.
Berk, Green and Naik (1999) for example describe the firm as a set of assets
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in place and a set of options. At every period, firms’ choice is whether to
invest by exercising the option that matures then. Firm’s vary in terms of
how many good options they have exercised which in turn implies that their
returns have different sensitivities to the aggregate shocks and therefore dif-
ferent expected returns. In another example, Zhang (2005) shows that one
way to rationalize the value premium is by modeling firms as facing different
temporary productivity shocks which leads to different rates of investment.
These different rates of investment imply that firms’ returns have different
sensitivities to aggregate shocks and therefore these firms have different ex-
pected returns. Other models with a similar structure in the sense that they
focus on firm investment are for example Gomes, Kogan and Zhang(2003)
and Carlson, Fischer, Giammarino (2004).
This literature, built in part upon the foundation of the q-theory of in-
vestment, has focused on describing a variety of mechanisms and frictions
that make some firms more risky than others. Because of the focus on q-
theory and its extensions, this literature has described firms mostly as mak-
ing choices about investment in capital, intangible capital, installed labor,
etc., in the presence of different frictions. These shocks and frictions pared
with the nature of the systematic risk in the model determine investment
dynamics, which in turn imply particular return dynamics and these then
have implications about cross sectional return patterns. While these mod-
els and this line of research in general have improved our understanding of
return determinants greatly, here we argue that a firm’s investment choice
is only one of many choices that these firms or their management teams
make. They make all kinds of decisions that are not easily equated with
investment, for example, having to do with marketing, with competition,
with research and development, etc. Some of these choices have potentially
more direct implications about the return dynamics of firms, and therefore
about their expected returns, than the investment choice that is typically
modeled.
This paper is also related to the literature that focuses on risk manage-
ment, idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns. In a purely empirical paper,
Gaspar (2006) for example finds that higher concentration or market power
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leads to lower idiosyncratic volatility (consistent with the model we present
below) and to lower information uncertainty for investors. Similarly Ang
el at. (2006) and Ang et al. (2009) find that high idiosyncratic volatility
is related to low stock returns, also consistent with the model below. In a
different track, Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) find that idiosyncratic volatil-
ity matters in an aggregate sense: higher average idiosyncratic volatility is
related to higher average stock returns. However, Bali, et al. (2005) dispute
these results, showing they are not robust to a more standard weighting
scheme, or to different data sources or periods. We contribute to this litera-
ture by proposing a model where firms’ attempts to reduce their systematic
riskiness have an effect on the idiosyncratic riskiness of their returns. The
model predicts that firms that invest in R&D to mitigate the high systematic
risk of their industry will have relatively low idiosyncratic return volatility.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 describes the in-
tuition of the paper by presenting a real world example to focus on and
by describing the basic intuition for the relationship between product dif-
ferentiation and returns; Section 2 describes the model in detail and solves
for some features of the optimal behavior of the firm; Section 3 describes
the model predictions; Section 4 describes the empirical exercise by explain-
ing the source of data on product differentiation and the empirical findings;
Section 5 concludes.
2 Intuition
2.1 Real World Example
A good real world example to focus on for the type of problem described by
the model is that of a car manufacturer like General Motors and its decisions
of how many new car models to develop and how many units to produce of
each one. In reality, among other strategic decisions GM will decide how
much time and effort to devote to new car model development. Each model
will have a market of different size, each will elicit more or less brand loyalty,
each will face more or less competition from existing or potential new models
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and so on. It is costly to develop these products. Automotive firms typically
create a concept car and show that around the world before actually defining
the product and producing it. Once GM develops a concept car it can then
gauge the size of the market for that product as well as how different or
unique it is viewed by car consumers, i.e. its degree of differentiation. After
it has found out the features of the market for each of its new products it
decides on production for each of them. This production is constrained by
how much total car production it can manage, say because it has a limited
number of plants. After it chooses the production level for each model GM
produces these cars and sells then at a price that has a systematic random
component in it.
In this story, because different products will have different price-cost
markups, the combination of products that GM ends up producing will
determine the systematic risk of future GM cash flows and profits. Therefore
GM’s development decisions are made in part based on their effect on the
riskiness of the firm’s cash flows. This in turn implies that the mix of car
models that GM brings to the market each year and the quantities that it
produces of each is in part a reflection of how much systematic risk GM
perceives there to be.
2.2 Differentiation and Riskiness
Figure 1: Product differentiation
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(b) More differentiated
Intuitively, a firm’s product is more ’differentiated’ if the price elasticity
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of demand is low. The two panels of Figure 1 show two linear demand
schedules with different slopes but the same price 0 demand level. They
also show the effect on profits of a fall in demand. All else equal, the
sales and profits from the more differentiated products have lower price
elasticity in the sense that a level or proportional change in price has a
larger proportional impact on the profits coming from the less differentiated
product.
In analytical terms, if demand D is a decreasing function of prices P , for
example if
D(P ) = kP−
then the price elasticity of demand is
eD = −PD′(P )/D(P ) = .
Also, if there’s a unit cost of production C, then price elasticity of profits is
epi = −Ppi′(P )/pi(P ) = −
[
P (1− )− C
P − C
]
.
Therefore high differentiation (or low ) implies low ’riskiness’ of profits
in the sense that their price elasticity is also lower.
3 The Model
In this section we introduce our formal model and analyze product devel-
opment, investment, markups and returns. In particular we solve for the
optimal output in each market as a fraction of total firm output. Then
we analyze how the firm’s decisions respond to changes in the amount of
systematic risk faced by the firm.
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3.1 The Firm
The firm maximizes the present, discounted value of profits net of invest-
ment:
maxE[MΠ]− δK − φN
Here, M is the discount factor with which the firm values future cash
flows in different states of the world, K is the capital necessary for pro-
duction and δ is its depreciation rate, Π are the firm’s total profits, φ is
the cost of ’developing’ new products and N is the number of new products
developed.
The firm’s profits are the sum of output times price across different
products that the firm produces:
Π =
∑
i=1..N
Pi(Yi, ζ, ξ)Yi
where Yi is the output level of a particular product i, ζ is an idiosyncratic
shock affecting the firm, ξ is a shock affecting the firm’s industry which we
call the industry’s systematic shock. We assume that ζ and ξ are uncorre-
lated. Also, we assume that ζ is uncorrelated with the discount factor M
and therefore that it represents diversifiable risk and that ξ is correlated
with M and therefore it represents un-diversifiable or systemic risk.
3.1.1 Product Development
There is an infinite number of potential product markets indexed by i =
1..∞, each characterized by the parameters of the demand for that product
(Ai, i) such that that product’s price function is:
Pi(Yi, ζ, ξ) = Ai
i
i − 1(Yi)
−1/i(ξζ)
where Pi are prices and Ai and i are constants determining the size
and price elasticity of that market. {Ai} and {i} are both iid series with
support on (1,∞) with distributions G and F . In this setup a high value for
EM, ξ implies low systemic risk since it implies the market values cash flows
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that are correlated with ξ as highly valuable. We interpret ξ as describing
the amount of systematic risk in a in industry during a period time. Also,
without loss of generality we assume that E[ξ] = E[ζ] = 1 .
3.1.2 Capital and Output
For each portfolio of new products that it has developed, the firm chooses
levels of production Yi in each industry . The firm’s total output is then the
sum of the individual product outputs:
Y =
N∑
1
Yi
There’s a single type of capital and the firm sets the capital level to
produce this total output Y using a decreasing returns to scale function
Y = (K)α
with α < 1 of capital.
3.1.3 Sequence of Events
The sequence of events is illustrated in figure 2. The firm starts without
knowing any of the product market characteristics A and . It knows the
quantity of systematic risk in the price of its products in the sense that it
knows the present discounted price of the shock ξ of its industry, E[Mξ].
Based on this information the firm then chooses how many and which new
products to discover by choosing N. It spends φ in discovering each of the
products and in exchange it finds out {Ai} and {i} for the market of each of
the products. The firm then chooses how much to produce of each product,
Yi, and how much to invest K to produce total output Y =
∑N Yi. It
chooses K and all Yi’s jointly: since there are decreasing returns to scale
in the production of output Y , then the optimal Yi’s and K are all jointly
determined.
Finally, after producing its output, the firm sells it and obtains profits
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that depend on the realization of ξ and on ζi for i = 1..N .
Figure 2: Sequence of Events
Firm observes 
systematic risk: 
E[Mx] 
Firm sets N , the 
number of products to 
develop, optimally 
Firm observes  the 
characteristics of each product’s 
market : {A,e}i  i=1..N 
Firm sets Yi, i=1..N and Y, the 
output for each product and 
total output, optimally 
Firm observes 
x, sells output 
obtains profits. 
3.2 First Order Conditions
The main intuition of the model can be derived from the first order con-
ditions of the firm’s product-level optimal output decision problem. This
is the problem the firm faces after it has chosen how many products to
develop and has found Ai and i for each of them. For each product that
it has developed the firm invests to equalize the marginal benefit and the
marginal cost of each output unit. The marginal benefit for each product
is the discounted expected value of profits from the sale of one extra unit
of that product. Note that this expected value is determined in part by the
price elasticity of demand for that product i:
MB = E[MAi(Yi)
− 1
i ξ] ∀i = 1..N.
The marginal cost is the depreciation of the increased capital necessary
to produce that extra unit of output. It can be written in terms of the total
output of the firma as:
MC =
δ
α
Y
1−α
α . (1)
This in turn implies that given Y ∗, the optimal output of a developed
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product i is:
Y ∗i =
(
µ
Aiα
Y ∗
1−α
α
)i
.
where we have written µ = E[Mξ] and Y ∗i = Y ∗i (Ai, i, µ, Y ∗) to simplify
the notation. Note that ζ disappears since we assumed that E[Mζ] = 0.
3.3 Number of Products Developed
The number of products developed is
N∗ = arg max
N
(
E{A},{}
[ ∑
i=1..N
Eξ,ζ [Pi(Y
∗
i )Y
∗
i ]
]
− δK ∗ −φN
)
.
The decreasing returns to scale assumption over production, which makes
the marginal costs in 1 above an increasing function of Y ∗, implies that N∗
is well defined in that N∗ <∞.
4 Predictions
These first order conditions show that the model is consistent with basic
intuition in the sense that an increase in the size of the market for product i,
(Ai ↑) results in an increase in the optimal output in that market. Similarly
an increase in one product’s differentiation (i ↓) implies that the firm’s
output in that industry increases as well. Moreover, decreasing returns to
scale in total output imply the opportunity cost of output increases when one
of the i decreases, which in turn implies that all else equal the production
of the other goods declines. Another basic prediction is that the firm will
invest less in producing all products if it perceives higher risk. Intuitively,
the firm is maximizing value and when risk increases the value of the risky
output that it produces declines while the costs of producing that output
do not.
Beyond these basic predictions, the model provides more interesting pre-
dictions about how the firm will react to changes in the riskiness it perceives.
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We focus on these predictions in the rest of the paper:
Proposition 1: Given a set of potential products, more systematic risk
leads to a higher ’output skewness’ in the sense that the firm focuses pro-
portionally more of its output on the most differentiated products.
Proof: This can be seen in the first order conditions above by noting that
output depends on E[Mξ] to the power of i. Higher i leads to a higher
response of output to changes in risk. In the limit, as the riskiness of the firm
goes to infinity, the firm will only produce its most differentiated product.
This is a key implication of the model: when systematic risk is high firms
endogenously choose a product mix with a higher average differentiation.
Corollary 1: Under the (typical) assumption that the level of risk is
counter-cyclical, firms have higher markups during bad times than during
good times, consistent with the evidence in for example Rotember and Sa-
loner (1986).
Corollary 2: Firms engage in less product market competition if systematic
risk is high than if it is low.
Proposition 2: If systematic risk is high firms will invest relatively more
on finding products that are differentiated.
Proof: This is a direct result of the skewness result above. Higher skewness
implies that firms’ value is more dependent on having a few good products.
Then taking a step back, the firm that is deciding how many products to
develop will spend relatively more on developing products in a setting of
high risk than in a setting of low risk because the value of finding a single
good product is higher than when risk is low. Note that this is a relative
statement: firms are not predicted to develop more products if systematic
risk is high, instead they are predicted to invest relatively more on research
and development than on production capacity in this situation.
Proposition 3: Under the assumption that firms’ exogenous idiosyncratic
risk is homogenous, firms with more systematic risk will appear to have less
idiosyncratic risk. In other words, the model predicts a negative correlation
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between measures market and idiosyncratic risk.
Proof: In the model firms with more systematic risk will invest more in re-
ducing their riskiness and therefore the same level of exogenous idiosyncratic
risk will lead to lower measures idiosyncratic risk.
5 Evidence
5.1 Returns Data and Accounting Data
For returns and accounting data we follow the standard in the literature and
use the CRSP and Compustat databases. We use data from 1980 to 2010
for results that do not involve product differentiation and data form 1996
to 2008 for those that do.
5.2 Product Differentiation Data
In this paper we use the product differentiation data of Hoberg and Phillips
(2010). This data is publicly available from the author’s website. It is built
from by using the 10k statements that are electronically available , (1996-
2008) to obtain a word count description of what the firm states that it
produces. These word count vectors are then compared to each other by
finding the ’angle’ between them in the sense of the dot product scaled by
the vectors magnitudes. The public data consists of a set of concentration
indicators that are calculated at industry and at firm level. Industry level
indicators are constructed by first creating data defined industries that are
fixed over time and then calculating Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes for these
industries. Firm-level concentration are built by ’measuring’ which firms are
close to the firm and then calculating the HH index using these firm’s sales.
This data has several advantages over other product market data sets.
First, the industry classifications are data driven rather than being artifi-
cially created by a government agency. Concentration in this setting implies
that there are few firms producing very similar set of products. for exam-
ple two firms that produce luxury, weather-proof, designer deck chairs, one
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of which produces them out of wood and one that produces them out of
steel, might end up in completely different industries in the standard SIC or
NAICS but would be very close competitors in the Hoberg-Phillips method-
ology.
Another advantage of this dataset is that it provides firm level compe-
tition indexes. This fact implies that tests of competition are much more
likely to have statistical power. In the SIC/NACIS setup analyists at S&P
or at the BEA classify a firm into an industry and make many compromises
in doing so. If three firms are in the same industry but two of them are
not competing against each other although they are competing against the
third, the standard classification methods will wrongly lead us to a single
HH index based on the sales of the three firms.
5.3 Results - Systematic Risk and R&D Expenditures
Proposition 2 above suggests that firms with higher systematic risk will
engage in more R&D. This is true in the data in the following sense: sorting
firms on the ratio of R&D to CapEx or sorting them on market β produces
very similar portfolios. Table 1 presents the results of regressing the R&D to
CapEx ration on the firm’s market β and the firm’s B/M ratio. We include
the B/M ratio a a way to capture the HML ’risk factor’ of Fama and French
(1993). It shows that indeed, market beta is a very significant predictor of
R&D expenditure relative to expenditure in productive capacity which we
proxy for with CapEx. This ratio is negatively related to B/M contrary to
the joint assumption that B/M is a good proxy for the risk factor known
as HML and that the firm invests in R&D to reduce its sensitivity to this
risk. In this setting the size of the firm is also negatively correlated to R&D
expenditures. Under the assumption that the firm’s market capitalization
is an inverse proxy for risk factor known as SML, the negative coefficient
is consistent with the theory above: larger firms that have lower SML risk
invest less in R&D relative to CapEx.
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Table 1: Regression analysis: R&D and Systematic Risk
This table presents a firm level regression of the average ratio of
R&D expenditures to CapEx, to the average market β, the average
Book to Market Ratio and the average size of the firm (Market
Equity). We have deleted all observations that have their R&D
expenditures missing in Compustat. On column two we present the
results of running the regression with Winsorized variables at the
0.5 % and 99.5 % levels.
Variable Non-Winsorized Winsorized
Beta 0.050 1.168
t-stat 0.19 5.73
BM -0.011 -0.078
t-stat -0.51 -2.72
ME -0.0002 -0.0004
t-stat -1.16 -4.55
R-square 0.02% 0.68%
5.4 Results - Product Differentiation
Table 2 describes the main empirical results of this paper. It shows that
there is not a clear pattern in the returns across firms with different product
market competition. This replicates the findings of Eli, Klasa and Yeung
using this very different product market competition data set.
We interpret these results as saying that systematic risk is highest for
the firms with the most differentiation. Under that assumption, the patters
in terms of Book/Market, Earnings/Sales and R&D/Investment conform to
the theory suggested above:
• First, consistent with Proposition 1, firms in more concentrated in-
dustries obtain higher margins, i.e. their earnings to sales ratios are
higher. Interpreting this fact through the model, it says that firms
in higher risk industries will focus more of their production on highly
differentiated products and have high average markups. This is also
consistent with the higher book to market values of firms that are in
a very competitive industry. More generally, this is consistent with
Corollary 2: firms in higher risk industries will engage in less compe-
tition.
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• Second, consistent with Proposition 2, firms in high systematic indus-
tries devote relatively more resources to finding differentiated prod-
ucts. The data is consistent with that prediction in the sense that
it shows that firms with more systematic risk are those with more
product differentiation. These are also those doing more research and
development relative to the amount of investment in productive capac-
ity that they are doing consistent with the regression results in table
1.
Table 2: Concentration, Returns, Profitability and Product Development
This table describes the characteristics and returns of 5 portfolios of
firms over the 12 years of the sample 1996-2008. Assets are total assets.
Size is market capitalization calculated as stock price times outstanding
stocks. B/M is the ratio of Asset and Size. Earnings is net operating
income before interest and depreciation. Investment is capital expendi-
tures. Stock returns are yearly values, calculated for a holding period of
one year starting in June of the year after portfolio formation. Returns
are equally weighted total returns. HHIV is the HH concentration index
based on product differentiation.
# R β Asset Size B/M
Earnings
/Sales
R&D
/Investment
HHIV
1 9.59 0.87 13330 2806 0.69 0.01 0.2 0.02
2 11.47 1.2 4758 4288 0.47 0.04 0.2 0.05
3 12.29 1.4 2648 2636 0.45 0.05 0.8 0.09
4 9.93 1.4 2380 2173 0.49 0.06 0.6 0.19
5 9.31 1.5 2088 1758 0.51 0.05 1.2 0.46
5.5 Results - Total Return Volatility
Tables 3 through 5 describe the exercise of separating firms into portfolios
according to their return volatilities. They also show the result of separating
recession and expansion periods. These tables are consistent with the theory
described above in the sense that:
• First, as Proposition 2 predicts, in the three tables it can be observed
that firms that face higher risk as described by the portfolio’s β are
firms that perfomr on average more R&D expenditures relative to their
CapEx expenditures.
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• Second, as Corollary 1 predicts, comparing tables 4 and 5 it can be seen
that during recessions firms invest relatively more on R&D (column
4) despite the fact that they invest less as a fraction of their market
capitalization (column 7).
Table 3: Volatility, Returns, Profitability R&D
This table describes the characteristics and returns of 5 portfolios of
firms over the period 1970-2010. Size is market capitalization calculated
as stock price times outstanding stocks. B/M is the ratio of Assets and
Size. Stock returns are yearly values, calculated for a holding period
of one year starting in June of the year after portfolio formation. In-
vestment represents CapEx. Market Beta is the regression coefficient of
stock returns on market returns over a 2 year window.
# R β
R&D
/Investment
B/M Size
Investment
/Size
1 0.006 0.84 0.36 0.74 927.3 0.074
2 0.007 1.27 0.46 0.78 254.6 0.071
3 0.008 1.46 0.85 0.72 125.4 0.060
4 0.009 1.70 1.62 0.66 72.4 0.051
5 0.004 1.82 2.53 0.56 37.5 0.037
Table 4: Volatility, Returns, Profitability R&D: Expansions
This table describes the characteristics and returns of 5 portfolios of
firms over the period 1970-2010. Size is market capitalization calculated
as stock price times outstanding stocks. B/M is the ratio of Assets and
Size. Stock returns are yearly values, calculated for a holding period
of one year starting in June of the year after portfolio formation. In-
vestment represents CapEx. Market Beta is the regression coefficient of
stock returns on market returns over a 2 year window. Business cycle
data is from the NBER.
# R β
R&D
/Investment
B/M Size
Investment
/Size
1 -0.002 0.83 0.35 0.83 1128.5 0.099
2 -0.006 1.30 0.41 0.85 279.8 0.093
3 -0.007 1.47 0.67 0.76 136.6 0.085
4 0.004 1.77 1.41 0.63 72.7 0.073
5 0.000 1.85 2.13 0.44 33.5 0.041
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Table 5: Volatility, Returns, Profitability R&D: Recessions
This table describes the characteristics and returns of 5 portfolios of
firms over the period 1970-2010. Size is market capitalization calculated
as stock price times outstanding stocks. B/M is the ratio of Assets and
Size. Stock returns are yearly values, calculated for a holding period
of one year starting in June of the year after portfolio formation. In-
vestment represents CapEx. Market Beta is the regression coefficient of
stock returns on market returns over a 2 year window. Business cycle
data is from the NBER.
# R β
R&D
/Investment
B/M Size
Investment
/Size
1 0.007 0.85 0.36 0.72 902.2 0.071
2 0.009 1.26 0.50 0.88 244.0 0.066
3 0.010 1.46 0.87 0.72 124.1 0.057
4 0.009 1.69 1.64 0.67 72.4 0.049
5 0.004 1.82 2.52 0.57 37.8 0.036
6 Conclusions
We develop a model of a firm that affects its systematic risk directly through
its product differentiation decisions. In the model the firm decides how many
products to develop and then how much of each of the products to produce.
The firm’s development and production decisions are related to systematic
risk in a way that implies the firm reacts to more systematic risk by making
a larger effort to reduce its riskiness. This insight lets us rationalize the fact
that firms in seemingly more concentrated industries and which therefore
should be less risky, do not pay their investors higher returns. Empirical
findings from a product market competition data-set that is closely aligned
with the model’s product differentiation description of competition provide
consistent empirical results. The model predicts firms with high systematic
risk to have high concentration ratios and high R&D investment and this
is what the data shows when taking market β as the measure of systematic
risk. Also, firms in more risky industries have higher earnings/sales ratios
and lower B/M ratios, again consistent with the theory. Finally, as the
model predicts, firms are shown to have higher R&D/ to CapEx investment
ratios during recessions despite having lower investment.
More generally the paper describes a firm that directly affects its risk-
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iness through the choice of investment in product development, and in a
the choice of what products to concentrate most of its production in, in
a way that is distinct from the standard models of how investment affects
firm’s riskiness. In the model systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and product
market competition become jointly endogenous, a feature that potentially
explains a number of otherwise surprising facts in the literature.
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